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Abstract
On ensuring the integrity of research documents in the digital age, a con-
cern of prime importance to the development of open access. New and old
solutions are presented, and a utility tool (tenaciouscookie).
Introduction
In this report, we propose that where research goes, a way to ensure their
integrity is given by the formula : hashing + public-key cryptography signing.
We look at the “old way” of how this would be done, and detail the steps.
We look at a new way of doing this with a utility called tenaciouscookie
– named so in homage to Aaron Swartz who worked in all of these areas.
In general, such utilities ought to be developed to make the life of re-
searchers easier. And, their development expended to and included in the
Web, in various forms (e.g. open access platforms, open access journals, etc.,
submissions (forms)).
1 Hashing, Public-key signing. The “old way”
We go through the steps of hashing and public-key cryptography signing by
using a real example.
1.1 Hash functions
Given a document document.pdf (or any other document) produced by a
researcher : we detail the steps of hashing followed by public-key signing,
the method we propose ought to be used by researchers to digitally ensure
the integrity of their research (and towards their readers).
To facilitate narration, discussion and reasoning, we choose a real docu-
ment produced by a researcher1.
1Yitang Zhang. “On the Landau-Siegel Zeros Conjecture”. https://arxiv.org/abs/
0705.4306. Submitted on 29 May 2007.
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This hypothetical researcher would proceed to produce what is called a
“hash” (a digital signature) for (their) this file.
Hash functions, including SHA-1, are described in Chap. 11.
For now it is sufficient to know that SHA-1 compresses x and
computes a 160-bit fingerprint. This fingerprint can be thought
of as a representative of x.2
When we talk of hashing, hashes, or hash values (more) precisely, we use
terminology that is important to keep in mind : additional terms such as
“digest” are often found in discussions relating to their uses, and it is good
to have a correct idea of their precise meanings.
Hash functions are an important cryptographic primitive and are
widely used in protocols. They compute a digest of a message
which is a short, fixed-length bit- string. For a particular message,
the message digest, or hash value, can be seen as the fingerprint
of a message, i.e., a unique representation of a message.3
There are thus the message – that which must be encoded – and the
message digest – the resulting hash value.
We demonstrate this on the basis of a primitive example.
Apply the hash function , SHA -1, to the message "hello ";
And , give back the message digest.
aaf4c61ddcc5e8a2dabede0f3b482cd9aea9434d
And, in real software (here using the Python Standard Library built-in
hashlib module of various hash functions),
>>> hashlib.sha1(b"hello").hexdigest ()
'6f9b9af3cd6e8b8a73c2cdced37fe9f59226e27d '
Or,
2Paar and Pelzl 2009. Chapter 10, 10.4.
3Ibid. Chapter 11.
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>>> message = "hello"
>>> hashlib.sha1(message).hexdigest ()
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "<stdin >", line 1, in <module >
TypeError: Unicode -objects must be encoded before hashing
>>> message = "hello". encode('utf -8')
>>> hashlib.sha1(message).hexdigest ()
'aaf4c61ddcc5e8a2dabede0f3b482cd9aea9434d '
>>> message
b'hello '
On Linux systems this is done with the series of sha<variant>sum utili-
ties e.g. sha256sum or sha512sum, as demonstrated below :
$ sha256sum zhang2007landausiegl.pdf
925
↪→ c988b4a4e2036146aab0021fd78e15c215de954170ce3acbfe8430e9181eb
↪→ zhang2007landausiegl.pdf
This hash is unique to this file – “almost”. Almost, probably : maybe.4
Theoretically, since the domain of SHA-256 contains 22
64−1
differ-
ent messages and the value set only contains 2256 different mes-
sage digests, there must exist at least one possible output that
has more than one possible pre-image.
Another important point is that SHA-256 is a deterministic func-
tion. This means that if you hash the same message twice, you
will get the same digest both times. Hence, “almost unique”
should be understood as meaning that SHA-256 will likely pro-
duce a different hash for each different input message. This might
be false in an abstract mathematical sense, but it is probably true
in a more practical sense:
In practice, uniqueness is not determined by the abstract theoret-
ical non-existence of collisions, but by the practical non-existence
of collisions. In order to find a collision in SHA-256, you would
4The issue is that of collision : when two different messages (can be made to) produce
the same hash. Such collisions are evoked, including actual attacks of older versions of
SHA, in Paar and Pelzl 2009.
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probably have to execute the algorithm some 2128 times. It is un-
likely that this will happen anytime soon, even if you count the
total number of times SHA-256 will ever be executed by anyone
in the entire universe combined.
Does a message “exist” if it belongs to a well defined abstract
set, or does it “exist” because it has actually been produced and
has been represented by someone or something in the physical
reality?5
The precise uniqueness of this digital signature is related to the two for-
mula given below :
22
64−1
= 22
63
= 1010
18.4434..
= 1 · 10184.434..
Which describes the domain, or set, of possible different messages. (That
can be passed to the SHA-256 algorithm/function, or any such algorith-
m/function.) We understand this to be an (almost) infinite amount, and
understand henceforth 22
64−1
to be some approximation of (almost-)infinity.
2256
= 1.1579.. · 1077
Which describes the domain, or set, of possible different values (“signa-
tures”) that can be generated by (with) the SHA-256 algorithm. This is a
finite set, we understand.
1.2 Public-private key signing
A researcher would then go on to create a pair of public-private keys.
This is done according to the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG, or gpg) “The
GNU Privacy Handbook” like so :
5Hellström 2015.
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alice% gpg --gen -key
With the following output, when done in actuality :
$ gpg --gen -key
gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.4; Copyright (C) 2017 Free Software
↪→ Foundation , Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and
↪→ redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY , to the extent permitted by law.
Note: Use "gpg --full -generate -key" for a full featured key
generation dialog.
GnuPG needs to construct a user ID to identify your key.
Real name: researcher
Email address: email
Not a valid email address
Email address: email@address
You selected this USER -ID:
"researcher <email@address >"
Change (N)ame , (E)mail , or (O)kay/(Q)uit? O
We need to generate a lot of random bytes. It is a good idea
to perform some other action (type on the keyboard , move the
mouse , utilize the disks) during the prime generation; this
gives the random number generator a better chance to gain
enough entropy.
...
gpg: key DB167D229155B65B marked as ultimately trusted
gpg: revocation certificate stored as '/home /.../. gnupg/
↪→ openpgp -revocs.d/
↪→ B5A4BB445AF838CA9B42BC72DB167D229155B65B.rev '
public and secret key created and signed.
pub rsa3072 ... [SC] [expires: ...]
B5A4BB445AF838CA9B42BC72DB167D229155B65B
uid researcher <email@address >
sub rsa3072 ... [E] [expires: ...]
Whereas the alternative command appearing as a note gives the following
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$ gpg --full -generate -key
...
Please select what kind of key you want:
(1) RSA and RSA (default)
(2) DSA and Elgamal
(3) DSA (sign only)
(4) RSA (sign only)
Your selection?
A user (researcher) may then check for (the existence of) their key :
$ gpg --list -keys
/home /.../. gnupg/pubring.kbx
----------------------------------
pub rsa3072 ... [SC] [expires: ...]
B5A4BB445AF838CA9B42BC72DB167D229155B65B
uid [ultimate] researcher <email@address >
sub rsa3072 ... [E] [expires: ...]
By which command, gpg --list-keys, only the public key will be listed.
And, for their private (“secret”) key :
$ gpg --list -secret -keys
/home /.../. gnupg/pubring.kbx
----------------------------------
sec rsa3072 ... [SC] [expires: ...]
B5A4BB445AF838CA9B42BC72DB167D229155B65B
uid [ultimate] researcher <email@address >
ssb rsa3072 ... [E] [expires: ...]
And, for both key’s ID’s6 :
$ gpg --list -secret -keys --keyid -format LONG
gpg: checking the trustdb
gpg: marginals needed: 3 completes needed: 1 trust model:
↪→ pgp
gpg: depth: 0 valid: 2 signed: 0 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m
↪→ , 0f, 2u
gpg: next trustdb check due at ...
6gpg --list-keys nor gpg --list-secret-keys alone will not give the keys’ id.
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/home /.../. gnupg/pubring.kbx
----------------------------------
sec rsa3072/DB167D229155B65B ... [SC] [expires: ...]
B5A4BB445AF838CA9B42BC72DB167D229155B65B
uid [ultimate] researcher <email@address >
ssb rsa3072/CB4D605828B18EDA ... [E] [expires: ...]
Where DB167D229155B65B describes the public key, and CB4D605828B18EDA
the private key.
The key ID’s are important for operations such as deletion of keys.
$ gpg --delete -key DB167D229155B65B
...
gpg: there is a secret key for public key "DB167D229155B65B "!
gpg: use option "--delete -secret -keys" to delete it first.
(Finally,) Signing of a file is done like so :
The command-line option –sign is used to make a digital signa-
ture. The document to sign is input, and the signed document is
output.
alice% gpg --output doc.sig --sign doc
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And, thus :
$ gpg --output zhang2007landausiegl.pdf.sig --sign
↪→ zhang2007landausiegl.pdf
The output is a document zhang2007landausiegl.pdf.sig of type “detached
OpenPGP signature”.
$ gpg --verify zhang2007landausiegl.pdf.sig
gpg: Signature made ...
gpg: using RSA key
↪→ B5A4BB445AF838CA9B42BC72DB167D229155B65B
gpg: Good signature from "researcher <email@address >" [
↪→ ultimate]
7The GNU Privacy Handbook.
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We suggest the researcher uploads this – now encrypted and signed – file
to any platform – it should not matter, along with the unencrypted, unsigned
file for convenience. For convenience, one version is uploaded encrypted, one
version is uploaded in the clear. But, should still be checked every time / in
any case.
Given a signed document, you can either check the signature or
check the signature and recover the original document. To check
the signature use the –verify option. To verify the signature and
extract the document use the –decrypt option. The signed docu-
ment to verify and recover is input and the recovered document
is output.
blake% gpg --output doc --decrypt doc.sig
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The signing of the original document itself through public-private key
cryptography should be enough, but the hash value may be certified in the
same way as well.
$ sha512sum zhang2007landausiegl.pdf >
↪→ zhang2007landausiegl_pdf_hash_.txt
$
$ gpg --output hash.sig --sign zhang2007landausiegl_pdf_hash_
↪→ .txt
$
2 tenaciouscookie : a utility to certify the
authenticity of digitally published research.
2.1 sha3-tc.py : SHA3 class hash functions utility pro-
gram.
A utility called sha3-tc.py is first presented that uses the latest class of
SHA3 hashing algorithms (instead of SHA2 class algorithms like SHA-256 or
SHA-512) :
8Ibid.
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$ python3 sha3 -tc.py zhang2007landausiegl.pdf
a36aabf486471783448f04b1b3b4d2eeecfca5c5363b4169570398dbf35725fdf3247f38da2
↪→
ec4af8a13f38b558d073cfc94a1e3ed07ab5551b97821ed77e043
Here, specifically the sha3 512 implementation of the Python Standard
Library is used (the highest available to our knowledge within that same
library).
It belongs to the implementations officialy recognized by the SHA3 work-
ing group.9
A sha3sum utility, of the likes of the sha<variant>sum utilities, does not
currently exist for Linux.
2.2 tenaciouscookie : easy signature creation.
$ python3 tc3.py zhang2007landausiegl.pdf
zhang2007landausiegl.pdf.sig signature file created for
↪→ zhang2007landausiegl.pdf
In the future, we would like to implement this as a (native) command-line
utility, that may be called like so :
$ tenaciouscookie filename.pdf
filename.pdf.sig signature file created for filename.pdf
But, for now, this is enough. Others may improve on it.
Future implementations may do hashing and signing together (in what
order, or how exactly, remains an open question).
—
Note that this utility currently requires version 3.6 or higher or Python
(3)10.
9“Implementations”. https://keccak.team/software.html
10“New in version 3.6: SHA3 (Keccak) and SHAKE constructors sha3 224(), sha3 256(),
sha3 384(), sha3 512(), shake 128(), shake 256().”. https://docs.python.org/3/
library/hashlib.html
10
1 import sys
2 import shlex
3 from subprocess import Popen, PIPE
4
5
6
7
8 if len(sys.argv) == 2:
9 filename = sys.argv[1]
10 else:
11 print('Error : you provided ' + str(len(sys.argv)) + '
argument(s).')↪→
12 print('Usage : provide a file name as additional argument to
the script (2 in total).')↪→
13
14
15 cmd = 'gpg --output {}.sig --sign {}'.format(filename,
filename)↪→
16
17
18 Popen(shlex.split(cmd), stdout=PIPE, stdin=PIPE, stderr=PIPE)
19
20 print("\n" + "{}.sig ".format(filename) + "signature file
created for " + filename)↪→
11
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